We study a simple model of tari¤ wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The introduction of costly governments leads to lower non-cooperative tari¤s, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tari¤ war, and fully cooperative trade deals where countries lower tari¤s but do not eliminate them, even with lump-sum taxes and transfers.
Introduction
The standard theoretical model of non-cooperative tari¤ determination leads to the familiar tari¤-war results (Johnson (1953) ). Some authors, including Krugman (1993 pages 61 and 65 and his references), have argued that this standard theoretical result may be inconsistent with observation -non-cooperative tari¤s appear to be set more "cooperatively", that is, lower. On the other hand, the traditional customsunion literature presumes free trade within each customs union. Here the reality is that tari¤s appear to be set less cooperatively, that is, higher. Even for members of trade blocs "cooperation" appears to be limited in the sense that trade deals while characterized by reciprocal reductions in tari¤s are not characterized by the elimination of tari¤s on all goods and services. The GATT under the auspices of the WTO furnishes many examples of such trade arrangements. This short paper provides a simple explanation for lower non-cooperative tari¤s and higher cooperative tari¤s. 1 The literature contains at least two classes of extensions to the traditional models that permit positive tari¤s in cooperative trade deals. One is obtained by altering the traditional assumption that benevolent governments act in the nation's self-interest. Examples of papers that would fall into this category are Grossman and Helpman (1994) , Krugman (1993) , and Ethier (1998) . A second explanation assumes that trade deals are not fully cooperative in the sense that it is assumed countries cannot make binding international commitments, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1997). model. 2 1) The introduction of a costly government may lower that country's noncooperative tari¤. The logic is that one of the bene…ts of a tari¤ is the revenue raised and since an increase in the cost of government reduces the net revenue for a given tari¤ it also reduces the optimal tari¤. Now consider two countries that di¤er in their costs of government.
2) The country with the less costly government can win a tari¤ war in the sense that it is better o¤ at the non-cooperative equilibrium than at the laissez-faire free trade allocation. Here the idea is that the country with lower costs will face a lower non-cooperative tari¤ the more costly is the opposing country's government (result 1); consequently the less costly country can win the tari¤ war.
We go on to explore an environment where fully cooperative trade deals are possible. We assume that the trade deal must be individually rational. Introducing the possibility of cooperative trade deals into our model of costly governments leads to two further results. Assume that governments are costly, but one government is more costly than the other. Then we show 3) Tari¤s will not be zero in a fully cooperative trade deal even with lump-sum taxes and transfers.
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In the case where the less costly government wins the tari¤ war (result 2) the free trade allocation is not a potential equilibrium trade deal because it is not individually rational for the less costly government. In such a case, absent revenue collection costs, trade deals would involve free trade and a lump-sum transfer of resources between countries (a compensation mechanism) to make it individually rational and Pareto e¢cient. But with costly governments the use of a tari¤ in the less costly country becomes an e¢cient instrument for transferring resources to that country. The idea is that raising resources in the more costly country to compensate the less costly country may be less e¢cient than permitting a positive distortionary tari¤ in the country with the lower revenue collection costs. At free trade, for example, the marginal damage of using the tari¤ is zero. 4) Fully cooperative trade deals may require each country lowering its tari¤s from the non-cooperative level without going to all the way to free trade. The two strands to the logic are that reducing tari¤s from their non-cooperative levels is exploiting gains from policy coordination, and not going all the way to zero tari¤s follows from result 3.
To summarize, we show adding the assumption that the operation of governments cost resources to a standard trade model may explain lower non-cooperative tari¤s and higher cooperative tari¤s.
Framework and Results
Assume a two-country, two-good, general-equilibrium trade model, in which each country is populated by a large number of identical price-taking individuals. We normalize the population size in each country at unity. Let t i denote a tari¤ set by country i and let ¿ i be a lump-sum tax (or subsidy) used to balance each country's government budget constraint. Denote the utility of each person in country i by U i (t i ; t j ; ¿ i ): Write the government's budget constraint in country i as R i (t i ; ¿ i ; c i ) = 0 where c i is a parameter measuring the costs of collecting and disbursing government revenue. For example, R i (t i ; ¿ i ; c i ) might equal f i (t i )+¿ i ¡c i (jf i (t i )j+j¿ i j); 0 < c i < 1; where f i is increasing and concave, or
If each country picks its tari¤/tax instruments to maximize U i subject to R i , taking as given the tax instruments of the other country, we obtain the standard non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in which typically t i > 0 and ¿ i < 0: Each country tries to turn world prices in its favour and to collect su¢cient revenue from its tari¤ to more than compensate for the damage the tari¤ does to its domestic economy. How is this equilibrium a¤ected by the costs of collecting revenue? To …x ideas suppose c 1 = c > 0 and c 2 = 0: Have individuals optimize and use the budget constraints in each country to eliminate the taxes and thereby to write utility as V 1 (t 1 ; t 2 ; c) and V 2 (t 2 ; t 1 ): Denote …rst and second partial derivatives by V From a total di¤erential of the system of equations we deduce (1) and (2).
Stability of the equilibrium implies D > 0: Thus dt 1 =dc has the sign of V is the marginal e¤ect of c on the net marginal bene…t to country 1 of raising t 1 . One of the bene…ts of employing a tari¤ is the revenue collected. Since higher c reduces the amount of revenue that a given tari¤ raises we assume that V 13 1 < 0: Result 1. With V 13 1 < 0, country 1's optimal tari¤ is decreasing in c: The sign of dt 2 =dc depends not only on V 13 1 but also on V 12 2 : If V 13 1 < 0 and the tari¤s are strategic complements (which is true in some trade models) then dt 2 =dc < 0: Higher costs of revenue collection in country 1 weaken its ability to conduct a tari¤ war and this could induce country 2 to levy a lower tari¤ than it would otherwise. In other words both non-cooperative tari¤s can be reduced by costly government. With c set equal to zero and the two countries roughly symmetric the tari¤ war typically leaves them both worse o¤ than they would be with zero tari¤s -both lose the tari¤ war. This, of course, is not the only possibility. Below, we present an example with R 1 (t 1 ; ¿ 1 ; c) = f 1 (t 1 ) + ¿ 1 ¡ c(jf 1 (t i )j + j¿ 1 j) where dt 1 =dc < 0 and dt 2 =dc = 0; that is, V Kennan and Riezman (1988) show that if one country is much larger than the other, this can lead to the large country winning the trade war. a large tari¤ may be diminished and it may even be optimal for country 1 to set t 1 to zero, for a high enough value of c: If c is so high that the optimal level of t 1 = 0 and if, for example, V 12 i = 0 then if country 2 chooses to have a positive tari¤ (V 2 (t 2 > 0; 0) > V 2 (0; 0)) it will win the tari¤ war. Here is the reasoning. First, country 2 may choose to have a positive tari¤ even if c is large because with V 12 2 = 0 country 2's optimal tari¤ is independent of c: Second, with V 12 1 = 0; country 1's optimal t 1 = 0 is independent of t 2 : So the choice of t 2 > 0 is enough to know country 2 will be better o¤ with the tari¤ war.
Result 2. The less costly government can win a tari¤ war.
What are the characteristics of possible cooperative trade agreements satisfying individual rationality, that is, when country 2's utility in the tari¤ war is higher than it would be with free trade? 6 E¢cient trade agreements are solutions to the following problem.
where S is a transfer from country 1 to country 2: It is impossible to provide a complete characterization of the conditions for Pareto e¢ciency with costly government without a complete model. We provide such a model in the following section, but here we show the possibilities by using the standard logic of optimal taxation.
With no revenue collection costs (c = 0) any point on the utility possibility frontier is attainable by setting tari¤s to zero and then using a head tax in one country and a head subsidy in the other, together with a transfer from the country with the tax to the country with the subsidy. If country 2 has "won" the tari¤ war (not because c > 0 but say because it is larger than country 1) then in any Pareto-improving and e¢cient agreement country 1 would levy a head tax and use the revenue so obtained to make a transfer to country 2; and country 2 would distribute the transfer to its citizens through a head subsidy. To repeat, there would be free trade in any Pareto-e¢cient agreement with c = 0.
When c is positive, however, e¢cient trade agreements lie along a utility possibility frontier, inside the costless government frontier except for one point. The point the two utility possibility frontiers have in common is the free trade point with no transfer between the counties (laissez-faire), for here all taxes/tari¤s and hence costs of revenue collection are zero for any c. The cooperative trade deal here is also the equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative game of coalition formation (see Burbidge et al. (1997, proposition 1) ).
What constitutes optimal tax/tari¤ combinations along the frontier with c > 0? Again, if country 2 has won the tari¤ war (because say c is su¢ciently large), the relevant segment is that section of the frontier where country 2's utility is higher than it is at free trade. So long as costs of revenue collection are symmetric between tari¤ and head tax revenue (as in the example revenue functions above) it can never be e¢cient to have a nonzero tari¤ in country 1: The reason is that country 1's tari¤ distorts resource allocation whereas its head tax does not, so setting t 1 = 0 is optimal. Next, starting at the free trade point, note that there are two ways to raise the welfare of country 2: (i) raise ¿ 1 above zero and use it to …nance a transfer S to country 2; or (ii) raise the tari¤ rate in country 2; t 2 ; above zero. In either case the revenue accruing to country 2 would be distributed through the costless head subsidy (¿ 2 < 0): 7 Option (i) is somewhat costly because of collection costs; option (ii) is somewhat ine¢cient because country 2's tari¤ distorts prices. The choice between (i) and (ii) is a standard optimal tax problem. If it is e¢cient to use both routes simultaneously it must be that the nature of collection costs is such that the marginal damage to utility per dollar of tax revenue raised is the same for both routes.
Assuming that the marginal collection cost of using ¿ 1 is positive and since the marginal damage of increasing t 2 at free trade is zero it must be that t 2 > 0 in any trade agreement with costly government. This is our third result.
Result 3. With governments that are costly but to di¤ering extents, tari¤s are not zero in a fully cooperative trade deal, even with lump-sum taxes and transfers.
Our last result is that one can …nd examples of initial tari¤-war Nash equilibria and associated utility possibility frontiers, with costly government, such that any point along the frontier that is a Pareto improvement (and therefore individually rational) over the tari¤ war equilibrium has lower tari¤s for both countries than tari¤s prevailing in the tari¤ war. We provide an example below.
Result 4. Fully cooperative trade deals may require each country lowering its tari¤s from the non-cooperative level without going to all the way to free trade.
An Example
Our example is a two-country, three-commodity simpli…cation of Grossman and Helpman (1994) , extended to allow for costly governments. The citizens of country i = 1; 2 consume X i j of good j and have an aggregate endowment A i of labour and a single speci…c factor T i which is essential in the production of good X i : Utility is quasilinear and has the following form.
Remember that we have set c 2 = 0:
Good 0 is produced in each country from labour alone with this constant returns to scale technology.
We assume the technology for the only other good produced by country i = 1; 2 has the following particular Cobb-Douglas form.
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All three goods are traded and we follow the literature in assuming that the trade in good 0 is free. Then by assumption, the imports into country i of good j will equal X i j for i 6 = j:
8 Consumers in country i maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
where r i and w i are the returns paid by competitive …rms to the …xed factor and to labour. Trade takes place and prices are determined by supply and demand; each factor is paid the value of its marginal product. For good 0 in each country we derive P o = w i : Choosing good 0 to be the numeraire we have P 0 = w i = 1: Assuming the parameters are such that X i 0¸0 ; for i = 1; 2; we obtain these demand functions.
for i = 1; 2 and i 6 = j (6)
The factor-pricing equations are
and equilibrium in the output markets yields
; for i = 1; 2 and i 6 = j:
The …rst and third equations can be solved in closed form for P i and L i and the solutions can then be used in the second equation to solve for r i , all of which yields:
Note from (7) we must assume that ad valorem tari¤ rates are not so negative that (1 + t j ) is negative. Equations (6) and (7) can then be used in (3) to write utility as a function of parameters, head taxes and tari¤s:
=2 ! Using (6), the tari¤ revenue in country i is
, and thus the budget constraints for the governments are: 
At the free trade (laissez-faire) allocation t i = 0; i = 1; 2; and therefore each country's utility is U i (0; 0; 0)´u f i ; for i = 1; 2: In a tari¤ war country i maximizes U i (t i ; t j ; ¿ i ) subject to (8) by choosing (t i ; ¿ i ) taking (t j ; ¿ j ) as given. For country 2 the …rst-order condition with respect ¿ 2 implies that the Lagrange multiplier is unity and then using this and the fact that t 2 must be positive for positive consumptions (see (6)) yields a dominant-strategy tari¤ of
In appendix A we show that the dominant strategy tari¤ for country 1 is
Note that we can now give the cost of government a formal interpretation as an amount of good 0 or labour (numeraire) consumed by government operations.
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This is a dominant strategy because the utility maximizing choices of country i do not depend on the choices of country j.
For c = 0; t e 1 = t e 2 = ( p 17 ¡3)=4 > 0 and we derive result 1 from the previous section; t e 1 is a decreasing function of c. The logic of the result is simply that the use of tari¤ involves costs and bene…ts where one of the bene…ts the tari¤ revenue raised. An increase in c reduces the revenue raised with a given tari¤ and thus it reduces the equilibrium tari¤. At c = 1=7 the costs dominate the bene…ts and thus t e 1 = 0: With the closed forms for t i , the government budget constraint (8) 
(see Appendix A). These then can be used in (3) to determine the dominant strategy equilibrium utilities of U e i (t i ; t j ; ¿ e i ). As above, we de…ne "winning a tari¤ war" as U 
one …nds that country 2 wins the tari¤ war for c > 1=15:
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In Appendix B we characterize world Pareto e¢ciency for this model, that is, the set of allocations from which it is not possible to make Pareto improvements.
A special case of our work in the appendix is e¢ciency when c = 0. It is characterized by two exchange e¢ciency conditions-one for each pair of goods and two overall e¢ciency conditions-one for each pair of goods. In terms of instruments and denoting the costless-government choices by a superscript ¤ the necessary conditions are t i = 0 for i = 1; 2: The free-trade (laissez-faire) allocation above is, of course, a Pareto e¢cient allocation with c = 0, but it is just one of a continuum. We show that with c = 0; the utility possibility frontier passes through (U f 1 ; U f 2 ) and has a constant slope of negative one. To achieve allocations where u
and there is an international transfer of resources from j to i.
In Appendix B we also show that when c > 0; Pareto e¢ciency involves free trade t i = 0 for i = 1; 2 only at the free trade allocation. Denoting choices with c > 0 by a ¤¤ superscript, we show that for U [Place Figure 1 here.] Figure 1 illustrates the tari¤-war equilibria for 0 · c · 1=7; the utility possibility frontier with c = 0 (which is a straight line), and the utility possibility frontier (hereafter the UPF -AC) for c = 1=7: All lines are based on A i = 3 and T i = 1; for i = 1; 2: The right panel is a blow-up of the marked section in the left panel -
To 10 decimal places it is 0:0671916407 which is slightly greater than 1=15:
; ¿ ¤¤ 1 = 0; and an international transfer is not used: Along AF; t falls from a value of unity at the free-trade point, A; to 1 ¡ c at the crossover point, X; and XC 0 is a straight line. We now provide an explanation of these results. To raise U ¤¤ 2 from the free-trade allocation the distortion associated with increasing t ¤¤ 2 from 0 is zero when evaluated at the free-trade allocation while the (marginal) cost associated with increasing ¿ ¤¤ 1 from 0 is c > 0: Thus initially the e¢cient solution is to allow country 2 to use its tari¤ to increase its well-being. As we require larger U at which point the distortion associated with increasing t ¤¤ 2 further would be larger than the cost associated with using ¿ : This continues to be true for all utility pro…les with larger U ¤¤ 2 because cost is linear in ¿ ¤¤ 1 : Note that increasing ¿ ¤¤ 1 from 0 always dominates increasing t ¤¤ 1 from 0 as both involve cost but the latter also distorts the prices of goods.
We are now in a position to provide proofs of results 3 and 4 from the previous section for this example. for 1=15 < c · 1=7. The intuition for these results is contained, of course, in the previous section.
Conclusions
The introduction of governments that use resources leads to lower non-cooperative tari¤s, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tari¤ war, and fully cooperative trade deals where countries lower tari¤s from their non-cooperative levels but do not eliminate them, even with the lump-sum taxes and transfers.
Appendix A The problem of country 1 is
Observe that the right-hand and left-hand derivatives of w(t 1 ; ¿ 1 ) di¤er at t 1 = 0 and ¿ 1 = 0:
Since c < 1 budget balance requires t 1 R 0 if and only if ¿ 1 Q 0.
For t 1 = 0 and ¿ 1 = 0 to be a solution then ³
@L @t 1´R
· 0 evaluated at t 1 = 0 anḑ = 1=(1 + c) so that it does not pay to increase t 1 from 0 and
evaluated at t 1 = 0; and¸= 1=(1 ¡ c) so that it does not pay to decrease t 1 from 0. Using the derivatives the latter holds for c 2 [0; 1) and the former holds for c¸1=7: Thus t e 1 = 0 and ¿ e 1 = 0 for c¸1=7: For t 1 < 0 and ¿ 1 > 0 to be solution then ³
= 0: This leads to two roots:
The …rst is not a solution as it implies t 1 > 0 for c 2 (0; 1): The second is not because it implies t 1 < ¡1 for c 2 (0; 1) which implies an imaginary number for a price (see (7)).
For t 1 > 0 and ¿ 1 < 0 to be solution then ³
(1+t 1 ) 2 (1+c) = 0. This leads to two roots :
The second is not a solution as it implies t 1 < 0 for c 2 [0; 1): The …rst is a solution for 0 · c < 1=7: For c¸1=7 it is not a solution to this case because it implies t 1 · 0 which contradicts our assumption here that t 1 > 0:
Thus the dominant strategy tari¤ for country 1 is t e 1 = 1 4(1+c) ³ p (17 ¡ 6c ¡ 7c 2 ) ¡ 3 ¡ 7cf or c < 1=7 and t e 1 = 1 for c¸1=7: The dominant strategy ¿ e 1 can then be derived from t e 1 and the budget constraint. We obtain
Appendix B
We solve the following problem to …nd Pareto e¢cient allocations with c > 0:
M ax t 1 ; t 2 ; ¿ 1 ; ¿ 2 ; S;¸1;¸2;¸3
where S is a transfer from country 1 to 2 and R 2 (t 2 ; ¿ 2 ) = t 2 =(1 + t 2 ) + ¿ 2 : We are interested in characterizing e¢cient allocations with U 2 (t 2 ; t 1 ; ¿ 2 )¸U f 2 : We assume that the three constraints bind: The …rst-order conditions for ¿ 2 and S yielḑ
or¸1 =¸2 =¸3´¸. Using this, the …rst-order condition for t 2 is ¡ 1 2 (2 + t 2 ) (1 + t 2 ) 2 +¸µ¡ 1 2
Solving and simplifying yields¸= 1 3+t 2 ¡2(1+t 2 ) 2 : As in Appendix A de…ne
For t 1 = 0 and ¿ 1 = 0 to be a solution to the problem ³
evaluated at t 1 = 0 and¸= 1 3+t2¡2(1+t2) 2 so that it does not pay to increase or decrease t 1 from 0 and ¿ 1 from 0: It is immediate that the free trade point t i = 0 and ¿ i = 0 for all i and thus¸= 1 is a particular e¢cient allocation, the one for U 2 = U 2 (0; 0; 0): Further when c = 0 the ³
and the tari¤s are t 2 = 0 so that¸= 1 3+t 2 ¡2(1+t 2 ) 2 = 1 and t 1 = 0 so that
= 0: Non-zero ¿ i and S are used to achieve utility pro…les other than that at the free trade allocation.
The tari¤ war results imply that starting at the free-trade equilibrium U 2 (t 2 ; t 1 ; ¿ 2 ) is increasing in t 2 for 0 · t 2 < 
